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1 Introduction
Most countries try to restrict lobbying by foreign lobby groups. For example,
in the United States, the 1974 amendment to the Federal Election Campaign
Act prohibits contributions by foreign nationals to Federal, state or local elec-
tions. In practice, however, subsidiaries of foreign companies are considered
as "American" if their lobbying activities are administrated by American
citizens and that only Americans contribute to their political action commit-
tees. Other countries also impose restrictions on foreign lobbying, including
the United Kingdom and the European Union, but, as in the United States,
there exist many loopholes.
The concern that advocates of such bans or restrictions often express
is that foreign campaign contributions subvert the goals of democracy and
undermine the legitimacy of government (see, e.g., the discussion by Savrin
(1988) or Powell (1996)). In contrast, opponents of restrictions point out that
foreign interests often have a legitimate stake in domestic policy making
because policy choices made by one country typically a¤ect the welfare of
citizens of other countries. Examples of this include environmental policy,
trade policy, labor standards etc. Since many policies produce such cross
national externalities, a potential benet of allowing foreign lobbying is that
it can help internalizing these externalities. This argument in favor of foreign
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lobbying is, we believe, important.
The purpose of this paper is to give it a proper theoretical underpin-
ning. To this end, we build on work by Helpman and Grossman (1995), Prat
and Rustichini (2003), Damania and Fredriksson (2007) and Fredriksson and
Millimet (2007) on common agency models with many principals and agents.
Gawande et al. (2006) develop a related model in which they study how
foreign rms, through lobbying of a government in a foreign country, can
reduce import tari¤s in their own industry. Our model is more general in
two regards. First, it recognizes that lobby groups will be operating in many
di¤erent countries at the same time, not just in one, and that foreign agents
often are a¤ected by policy choices made in particular country even if they
are not directly engaged in economic activity in that country.1 The situation
we study is therefore one with many governments (agents) and many lobby
groups (principals) rather than one with one government (agent) and many
lobby groups (principals). Importantly, this formulation allows us to show
how and when all cross national externalities can be internalized through
foreign lobbying. Second, we are not specic about what generates the cross
nation externality, so our model applies to a large range of cases, including
environmental, competition and labour regulation as well as to trade policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
1Environmental externalities are the leading example of this.
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the model. In Section 3, we compare equilibrium outcomes in two situations:
one with a ban on foreign lobbying and one without. We show formally how
foreign lobbying can internalize externalities. In Section 4, we discuss some
implications of the analysis.
2 The Model
We consider a world populated by lobby groups and policy makers (govern-
ments). The lobby groups o¤er campaign contributions to the policy makers
to inuence their policy actions, but may face restrictions on who they are
allowed to o¤er these contributions to. Let the set of lobby groups be de-
noted M with m 2 M and the set of policy makers be denoted N with
n 2 N . Both sets are nite and discrete and have cardinality jM j and jN j,
respectively. Policy maker n takes a single policy action xn 2 R.2 The pay-
o¤ of lobby group m depends on the policy actions taken by all the policy
makers, i.e., x = (xn)n2N , and is denoted by u
m(x). We assume that um(x)
is strictly concave. We denote the contribution schedule o¤ered to policy
maker n by group m by Cnm(xn;x n). The contribution schedules specify a
2In contrast to Damania and Fredriksson (2007) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2007)
who study a situation in which each policy maker has veto over a common policy action,
we assume that each policy maker has full control over his own policy action. A similar
approach is taken in Conconi (2003) and Aidt and Hwang (2008).
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particular payment to be made to policy maker n if he takes policy action
xn. We assume that the contribution schedules are di¤erentiable. We allow
for the possibility that the payment o¤ered to a particular policy maker for
action xn may indirectly depend on the policy actions taken by the other
policy makers, x n = (xk)k2N;k 6=n. This interdependency arises naturally in
many contexts. Contribution schedules that are locally truthful, for example,
reect the marginal value to the lobby groups of the policy favors bestowed.
In many applications, these marginal values depend on the policy actions
taken by all policy makers. Suppose, for instance, that the policy actions
are environmental taxes implemented in di¤erent jurisdictions. Then, the
marginal value to, say, an environmental lobby group of an increase in the
tax in one jurisdiction depends on the taxes implemented in the others. This
is simply because marginal environmental damage depends on the entire tax
vector. We assume that policy maker n cares only about the contributions
that he collects from the lobby groups, i.e.,
X
m2M
Cnm(xn;x n).
The relationship between the policy makers and the lobby groups is mod-
elled as an agency game. The game has two stages. In the rst stage, given
the institutional constraints on the types of contributions that are allowed,
each lobby group o¤ers contribution schedules to the policy makers taking the
schedules o¤ered by the other lobby groups as given. In the second stage,
each policy maker implements the policy action that maximizes his total
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contribution income taking as given the policy actions of the other policy
makers.
To focus on the question of foreign lobbying, we assume that each policy
maker represents a national government. We can then partition the set of
lobby groups into jN j disjoint sets, with M = [n2NMn. The set Mn is the
set of lobby groups located in country n. We assume that each country
has at least one lobby group. Since the payo¤ of each lobby group depends
on the entire vector of policy actions, the policy action taken by any given
government a¤ects the welfare of the lobby groups in all countries. Thus, the
policy actions produce cross national externalities.
3 Analysis
We denote the socially optimal policy vector by
fxngn2N = arg max
(xn)n2N
P
n2N
P
m2Mn u
m(x): (1)
The outcome in political equilibriummay di¤er from this because of lobbying.
We compare two scenarios: one with a ban on foreign lobbying and one
without.
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3.1 Ban on Foreign Lobbying
In this scenario, the national lobby groups can o¤er contribution schedules
only to their own government. Formally, if m =2 Mn, then Cnm(xn; x n) 
0. The game between the national lobby groups and their government is a
common agency game. Using the equilibrium characterization provided for
this case by Grossman and Helpman (1995), we can state (without proof)
the following result.
Proposition 1 (Ban on foreign lobbying). The equilibrium policy vector is
(exn)n2N where exn = argmaxxn P
m2Mn
um(xn; ex n) for all n 2 N . Moreover,
(exn)n2N 6= fxngn2N .
With a ban on foreign lobbying, each policy action is chosen in isolation.
It maximizes the sum of the payo¤ of the government responsible for the
action and the national lobby groups, taking as given the policy actions of
the other governments. As a consequence, the cross national externalities
are not internalized. The vector of equilibrium policy actions is socially
ine¢ cient.
3.2 Foreign Lobbying
In this scenario, the lobby groups can o¤er contributions to all governments.
Formally, the game between the governments and the lobby groups becomes
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a multiple principal, multiple agent game. Prat and Rustichini (1999, 2003)
provide an equilibrium characterization for this case that can be adopted
to a setting with a continuous action space, as in Damania and Fredriksson
(2007). As mentioned above, we allow for the possibility that the contribu-
tion schedule o¤ered to a particular government may depend indirectly on
the policy actions taken by other governments. This complicates the char-
acterization of equilibrium. Suppose, however, that each government only
observes the contribution schedules o¤ered to itself and that it forms beliefs
about the contribution schedules o¤ered to the other governments that do
not depend on the o¤ers it receives itself. Under these assumptions, Prat
and Rustichini (1999, Theorem 8) show that the following equilibrium char-
acterization applies.
Lemma 1 (P-R) A pair (( bCnm)n2N;m2M ; x), consisting of a vector of feasible
non-negative contribution schedules and a vector of policy actions, consti-
tute a pure strategy equilibrium outcome if and only if the following three
conditions hold:
(AM) For all n 2 N and xn 2 R,
bxn = argmax
xn
P
m2M bCnm(xn; bx n)
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(IC) For every m 2M and x 2 RjN j
bx = argmax
x
um (xn; x n) +
P
n2N
P
j2M;j 6=m bCnj (xn;x n)
(CM) For every m 2M and n 2 N
P
m2M bCnm(bxn; bx n) = maxxn Pj2M;j 6=m bCnj (xn; bx n)
The rst condition, agent maximization (AM), requires that each gov-
ernment selects the optimal policy action given the contribution schedules
o¤ered to it and given the equilibrium actions of the other governments. The
second condition, incentive compatibility (IC), requires that a lobby group
m cannot nd contribution schedules that yield higher payo¤s than its equi-
librium schedules given the equilibrium contribution schedules of the other
lobby groups. An implication of this is that the vector of equilibrium policy
actions must maximize the joint surplus of each lobby group and the collec-
tive of all governments. This is what condition (IC) says. The third condition
is a cost minimization condition (CM). It requires that the equilibrium con-
tribution schedules are such that no lobby group can get the equilibrium
policy vector implemented at lower cost.
Using this characterization, we can prove the main result of the paper.
Proposition 2 (Foreign lobbying) The equilibrium policy vector with foreign
lobbying, (bxn)n2N , internalizes all cross national externalities. Moreover,
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(bxn)n2N = fxngn2N .
Proof. Condition (IC) implies that bx must satisfy
@um(bx)
@xn
+
X
j2M;j 6=m
@ bCnj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
+
X
k2N;k 6=n
X
j2M;j 6=m
@ bCkj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
= 0 (2)
for all m 2M and n 2 N . Adding these conditions up, we get
X
m2M
@um(bx)
@xn
+(jM j   1)
X
j2M
@ bCnj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
+(jM j   1)
X
k2N;k 6=n
X
j2M
@ bCkj (bxn; bx n)
@xn
= 0:
(3)
Since maxxn
P
j2M;j 6=m bCnj (xn; bx n) is a constant, condition (CM) imposes
the following restrictions on the marginal contribution schedules, evaluated
at the equilibrium policy vector:
X
m2M
@ bCkm(xn; bx n)
@xn
= 0 for all k 2 N: (4)
This implies that equation (3) reduces to
X
m2M
@um(bx)
@xn
= 0 for all n 2 N , (5)
which is the necessary condition for maximization of social welfare
The proposition shows that foreign lobbying can serve a socially useful
purpose: it internalizes cross national externalities. Foreign lobbying allows
each government to accept contributions from foreign as well as national
lobby groups. Foreign lobby groups only have an incentive to o¤er these
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contributions if they have a stake in the policy action. In e¤ect, they reward
the governments for taking into account the e¤ect of their policy actions on
the welfare of the foreign special interests represented by the foreign lobby
groups. As a result, cross national externalities are internalized.
4 Discussion
We have formalized the case for legalizing all foreign lobbying based on a
simple externality argument. In our specication, internalization is complete
because all a¤ected parties are organized in lobby groups and represent a
national interest. In reality, this may not be case. Externalities are then
only partly internalized and other social objectives may be compromised.
In particular, when important segments of society remain unorganized, for-
eign lobbying as well as national lobbying may have undesirable side e¤ects.
For example, in the case of an environmental externality, lobbying against
environmental protection by a well-organized foreign industry lobby group
may have detrimental environmental e¤ects, not only for unorganized citi-
zens in the country concerned but also for citizens in the country that hosts
the foreign lobby group. In other cases, the side e¤ects are more benign.
In fact, if foreign lobbying is targeted at reducing trade barriers (Husted,
1991; Gawande et al., 2006) or at gaining preferential market access (Kee et
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al. 2007), this can increase the welfare of unorganized consumers. In some
cases, however, foreign lobbying encourages political parties to replace tari¤s
with negotiated voluntary export restraints (Hillman and Ursprung, 1988).
The resulting loss of revenue may place an additional burden on unorganized
consumers. Keeping these caveats in mind, we nevertheless believe that the
externality argument in favor of foreign lobbying is quite general, has a solid
analytic foundation, and is of practical importance. It should, therefore, be
part of an informed debate about the role of foreign lobbying and bans on for-
eign donations to domestic political campaigns. As pointed out by Gawande
et al. (2007), in an interesting study of the link between foreign lobbying and
Caribbean tourism, foreign lobbying may even in some cases be a vehicle for
development. Ultimately, of course, these benets must be quantied and
weighted against any loss in democratic legitimacy, but it is important to
consider the costs as well as the benets to reach a balanced view on the
consequences of banning foreign lobbying.
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